"Подлинность соборного осуждения Оригена и его учения, произнесенного Церковью на V Вселенском соборе"

The authenticity of the conciliar condemnation of Origen and his teachings, the Church pronounced

on V Ecumenical Council

 

Публикуя статью Edward Moore «Origen of Alexandria» и «Origen of Alexandria and apokatastasis: Some Notes on the Development of a Noble Notion» мы имели своей целью дать более обширный материал касательно взглядов Оригена, еще раз показать, что учение о предсуществовании душ, совечности материи Богу, о всеобщем восстановлении (апокатастасисе ) действительно «исповедовались» Оригеном.  Однако ни в одной из этих статей, хотя автор себя представляет как православного христианина,  совершенно не упоминается факт церковного осуждения Оригена и его учения. При этом автор пытается уйти даже от всяких упоминаний о существующих в современной церковно-исторической патристической науке  прениях относительно подлинности анафематизмов св. императора Юстиниана на Оригена и его учение, подлинности определения V Вселенского собора об осуждении Оригена и его творений. Тем не менее, мы считаем своим долгом упомянуть о том, что в наше время активно развивается богословское направление, которое ставит своей целью не только «оправдать Оригина»[1], но и поставить его на пьедестал величайших учителей Древней Церкви. С этой целью в современной западной исторической и богословской науке делаются попытки поставить под сомнение достоверность 11п. анафемы в тексте ороса Вселенского собора[2] и 15 анафематизмов императора Юстиниана.[3] При этом о первом часто не упоминается вообще. Но подлинность этого осуждения имеет весьма веское доказательство в 1 правиле VI  Вселенского собора. В тексте этого правила мы Находим подтверждение вынесенным прежде Церковью решениям об осуждении «Феодоора Мопсуэтского, Несториева учителя, и Оригена, и Дидима, и Евагрия, возобновивших эллинские басни» (τούς τάς Ἑλληνικάς ἀναπλασαμένους μυθοποιίας).[4] Не ставят под сомнение подлинность этого соборного определения об осуждении «Оригена и его нечестивых сочинений» такие авторитетнейшие канонисты Православной Церкви как Зонара и Аристин. [5] О вынесении собором решения об осуждении Оригена и его учения упоминается и в «Церковной истории» Евагрия.[6] Второй документ, анафематизмы св. императора Юстиниана[7], рассматривается как «подложный», либо носящим в себе отпечаток проявленя «чрезмерной горячности и ревности императора».[8] Удивляет даже то, что даже римо-католические исследователи ставят под сомнение подлинность вынесенного V Вселенским собором осуждения Оригену.[9] Однако второй документ имеет бесспорный характер.[10] Он помещен и в русском переводе Деяний V Вселенского собора  на стр. 536-537. Важным подтверждением подлинности упоминаемых соборных актов является наличие в недавно переизданные Деяния Вселенских соборов. Этот труд был осуществлен на Святой Горе Афон (Πρακτικά τῶν Ἁγίων Συνόδων. Ἔκδ. Καλύβης Τιμίου Προδρόμου. Ἅγιον Ὄρος, τόμος Β'σελ. 364 Γράμμα τοῦ βασιλέως Ἰουστιανοῦ πρός τήν ἁγίαν Σύνοδον περί Ὡρηγένους...). Это издание является репринтным, но, одновременно, критическим переизданием Деяний, впервые изданных в Венеции в 1761г. архимандритом Вселенской Патриархии Спиридоном Милия (Σπυρίδωνος Μήλια). Это первое научное издание Деяний Вселенских включает в себя не только Деяния Святых Вселенских соборов, но и важных авторитетных поместных соборов проходивших после VII Вселенского собора (879-80, 1341, 1351, 1691  и др.). То есть по замечанию протопресвитера, профессора Фессалоникского университета Феодора Зизиса, это издание содержит в себе важнейшие символические тексты Православной Церки, выражающей в письменном виде ее сознание, веру.

  В описании же истории V Вселенского собора (Ἱστορία τῆς ἐν Κωνσταντινουπόλει Πέμπτης Οἰκουμενικῆς Ἁγίας Συνόδου, σελ. 367-370) сообщается и об осуждении ошибочных учений Оригена.[11] Подвергаемый сомнению протестантской и даже католической критикой 11 пункт из анафем ороса этого Собора, в котором предаются анафеме Арий, Евномий, ...Несторий, Евтихий и Ориген с нечестивыми их сочинениями (μετά  τῶν ἀσεβῶν αὐτῶν συγγγραμμάτων)  мы также находим в этом издании на с. 343. Поэтому мы не можем согласится с какими-то попытками оправдать или «восстановить» достоинство Оригена, закрывая глаза на вполне ясные доказательства произнесенного на V Вселенском соборе  осуждении Оригена, его заблуждений и сочинений. Поэтому мы считаем весьма непростительной ошибкой,а в особенности православным профессорам, говорить о том, что учение об  «апокатастасисе» как частное мнение не имеет церковного осуждения.[12] А для Церкви весьма огромную опасность представляет появление в «Православной энциклопедии» статей, основанных на непроверенных теориях и мнениях, богословских дискуссиях, но при этом отвергающих очевидный факт соборного осуждения Оригена.   Несомненно  то, что анафематизмы св. императора Юстиниана, а также «составленное монахами письменное донесение против учения Оригена»[13] вошли не только в Деяния собора, но стали основой для вынесения осуждения Оригену и его творениям в итоговом соборном оросе.[14] Для большей ясности и избежания всяческих попыток сомневаться в соборном осуждении Оригена и его учения мы специально приводим п. 11 соборного ороса:

 «Если кто не анафематствует Ария, Евномия, Македония, Аполлинария, Нестория, Евтихия и Оригена, с нечестивыми их сочинениями, и всех прочих еретиков, которые были осуждены и  анафематствованы Святою Кафолическою и Апостольскою Церковью и святыми четырьмя помянутыми соборами, и тех, которые мудрствовали или мудрствуют подобно вышесказанным еретикам, и пребыли в своем нечестии до смерти: тот да будет анафема».[15]

А 9 анафематизм св. императора Юстиниана самым непосредственным образом осуждает учение об апокатастасисе:

Кто говорит или думает, что наказание демонов и нечестивых людей врменно и что после некоторого времени оно будет иметь конец, или что будет после восстановление демонов и нечестивых, - да будет анафема.

А 10-ым осуждается Ориген и высказывающин его мнения:

Анафема и Оригену, прозванному адамантовым, изложившему это вместе с его нечестивым, непотребными преступным учением, и всякому, кто держится этих мыслей, или защищает их, или каким-нибудь образом когда-либо осмелится повторять их.[16]

Origen of Alexandria (185—254 CE)

Ориген Александрийский

Origen of Alexandria, one of the greatest Christian theologians,  is famous for composing the seminal work of Christian Neoplatonism, his treatise On First Principles. Origen lived through a turbulent period of the Christian Church, when persecution was wide-spread and little or no doctrinal consensus existed among the various regional churches. In this environment, Gnosticism flourished, and Origen was the first truly philosophical thinker to turn his hand not only to a refutation of Gnosticism, but to offer an alternative Christian system that was more rigorous and philosophically respectable than the mythological speculations of the various Gnostic sects. Origen was also an astute critic of the pagan philosophy of his era, yet he also learned much from it, and adapted its most useful and edifying teachings to a grand elucidation of the Christian faith. Porphyry (the illustrious student of Plotinus), though a tenacious adversary of Christianity, nevertheless grudgingly admitted Origen’s mastery of the Greek philosophical tradition. Although Origen did go on to compose numerous biblical commentaries and sermons, his importance for the history of philosophy rests mainly on two works, the systematic treatise On First Principles, and his response to the pagan philosopher Celsus’ attack on Christianity, the treatise Against Celsus. Since the purpose of this article is to introduce students and interested laypersons to the philosophy of Origen, it will be necessary to focus mainly on the treatise On First Principles, which is the most systematic and philosophical of Origen’s numerous writings. In this work Origen establishes his main doctrines, including that of the Holy Trinity (based upon standard Middle Platonic triadic emanation schemas); the pre-existence and fall of souls; multiple ages and transmigration of souls; and the eventual restoration of all souls to a state of dynamic perfection in proximity to the godhead. He is unique among Platonists of his era for introducing history into his cosmological and metaphysical speculations, and his insistence on the absolute freedom of each and every soul, thereby denying the fatalism that so often found its way into the more esoteric teachings of the various philosophical and mystery schools of his day.

Table of Contents

1.   Origen’s Life and Times

2.   His Intellectual Heritage: Pagan, Jewish and Christian

3.   The Philosophical System of Origen

1.   The Trinity

2.   Souls and their Fall

3.   Multiple Ages, Metempsychosis, and the Restoration of All

4.   Important Themes in Origen’s Philosophy

1.   Free Will

2.   Education and History

3.   Eternal Motion of Souls

5.   Origen’s Importance in the History of Philosophy

1.   Hellenistic Philosophy

2.   Christianity

6.   Concluding Summary

7.   References and Further Reading

1. Origen’s Life and Times

Origen was, according to Eusebius, “not quite seventeen” when Septimius Severus’ persecution of the Christians began “in the tenth year of [his] reign,” (Ecclesiastical History; tr. Williamson, p. 179) which gives the approximate date of Origen’s birth as 185/6 C.E. He died around the reign of Gallus, which places his death in 254/5 C.E. Origen lived during a turbulent period of the Roman Empire, when the barbarian invasions were sweeping across Europe, threatening the stability of the Roman Empire. His was also a time of periodic persecution against Christians, notably during the reigns of the Emperors Severus, Maximin, and Decius, so that Origen’s life began and ended with persecution.

His family was devoutly Christian, and likely highly educated; for his father, who died a martyr, made sure that Origen was schooled not only in biblical studies, but in Hellenistic education as well. Eusebius (Ecclesiastical History, tr. Williamson, p. 182) tells us that Origen was only seventeen when he took over as Headmaster (didaskalos) of the Christian Catechetical School at Alexandria. He became interested in Greek philosophy quite early in his life, studying for a while under Ammonius Saccas (the teacher of Plotinus) and amassing a large collection of philosophical texts. It is probably around this time that he began composing On First Principles. However, as he became ever more devoted to the Christian faith, he sold his library, abandoning, for a time, any contact with pagan Greek wisdom, though he would eventually return to secular studies (Greek philosophy), from which he derived no small measure of inspiration, as Porphyry (recorded in Eusebius) makes quite clear, as he continued with his ever more sophisticated elucidation of biblical texts.

2. His Intellectual Heritage: Pagan, Jewish and Christian

Origen’s debt to Holy Scripture is obvious; he quotes the bible at great length, often drawing together seemingly disparate passages to make a profound theological point. Yet his thought is all the while informed by his Greek philosophical education, specifically that of the Middle Platonic tradition, notably the works of the Jewish Platonist Philo of Alexandria and the Neopythagorean philosopher Numenius of Apamea (fl. 150-176 C.E.). Origen shares with Philo an insistence on the free will of the person, a freedom that is direct evidence of humanity’s likeness to God – for, like God’s Being, human existence is free from all necessity. From Numenius, Origen likely adopted the conception of a “second god” proceeding from a first, ineffable being called the One, “First God,” or Father. Numenius referred to this “second god” as Demiurge or craftsman, and taught that he created the cosmos by imitating the intellectual content of the “First God.” Origen applied this basic notion to his doctrine of Christ, whom he also called Demiurge (Commentary on John 1.22), and went on to describe Christ as a reflection of the Truth of the Father, stating that compared to human beings Christ is Truth, but compared to the Father He is falsehood (Jerome, Epistle 92, quoting Origen; see also On First Principles 1.2.6).

Another extremely important part of Origen’s intellectual heritage is the concept of apokatastasis or “restoration of all things.” This term first appears, as a philosophical concept, in the writings of the Stoics, whose materialistic pantheism led them to identify Zeus with the pure, “craftsmanly” fire pervading and constituting the cosmos. According to the Stoics, this fire expands and contracts according to a fixed cycle. They called the contraction a “conflagration” (ekpurôsis), destroying the cosmos, yet only temporarily. This contraction was described as Zeus returning to his own thoughts, to contemplate the eternal perfection of his mind/cosmos (the material cosmos being the expression of his mind, or Logos). The expansion would occur when Zeus once again expressed his mind in the creation of the material cosmos; this re-creation or reconstitution of the cosmos is what the Stoics called apokatastasis. Some Stoics argued that since Zeus is perfect mind, then every reconstitution of the cosmos will resemble identically the one that preceded it. This Stoic doctrine was to have an immense influence on the development of the so-called esoteric traditions in the Hellenistic era, notably the Hermetic school, Gnosticism, and astrology, with all of which Origen was, in varying degrees, familiar.

In Origen’s time, Christianity as a religion had not yet developed a system of theology as a basis of orthodoxy; therefore, in addition to a wide variety of opinions regarding the faith, there were also various sects, each claiming to possess the truth of the Christian faith. Foremost among these sects was the group of schools loosely labelled ‘gnostic.’ The Valentinian school (founded by Valentinus, an outstanding teacher and philosopher who was at one point a candidate for bishop of Rome) was the most philosophically accomplished of the Christian Gnostic sects. In his Commentary on John, Origen refutes the doctrines of a Valentinian Gnostic named Heracleon, who had earlier written a commentary on the same Gospel. While Origen’s opposition to Gnosticism precluded any doctrinal influence, he saw in Gnosticism the value of a system, for it was precisely by virtue of their elaborate and self-consistent systems that the Gnostics were successful in gaining adherents. Since there were no non-Gnostic Christian theological systems in his day, it was up to Origen to formulate one. This was the program of his treatise On First Principles.

3. The Philosophical System of Origen

Origen was the first systematic theologian and philosopher of the Christian Church. Earlier Christian intellectuals had confined themselves to apologetic and moralizing works; notable among such writers is Clement of Alexandria (d. 215 C.E.), who, like Origen, found much of value in Hellenic philosophy. Before proceeding with an examination of Origen’s system, it must be noted that scholars are divided over the question of whether or not his On First Principles contains a system. Henri Crouzel (1989), for example, has argued that the presence of contradictory statements in certain portions of the treatise, as well as in other texts, is proof against the claim that Origen was presenting a system. Hans Jonas (1974), on the other hand, recognized a clear system in On First Principles and gave a convincing elucidation of such. The reason for this scholarly divide is mostly due to the lack of a precise definition of ‘system’ and ‘systematic’. If one approaches Origen’s text expecting a carefully worked-out system of philosophy in the manner of a Kant or a Hegel, one will be disappointed. However, if one reads the text with an eye for prominent themes and inner consistency of such themes with one another, a system does emerge. As John Dillon has pointed out, Origen succeeded in luring away several students of the renowned Platonic teacher Ammonius Saccas to study with him, and, Dillon convincingly observes, this would not have been possible if Origen did not have some system to offer (Dillon, in Kannengiesser, Petersen, ed. 1988, p. 216, and footnote). It must also be pointed out that the text of On First Principles that we possess is not complete. Origen’s original Greek is preserved only in fragments, the remainder of the text is extant only in a Latin translation by Rufinus, who was a defender of Origen against posthumous charges of heresy. While Rufinus’ translation is, as far as we can tell, faithful in most respects, there is ample evidence that he softened certain potentially troublesome passages in an ill-guided attempt to redeem his beloved teacher. When reading Origen’s treatise, then, one would do well to keep this in mind should one stumble across seemingly contradictory passages, for one has no way of knowing what the original Greek might have said.

a. The Trinity

Origen begins his treatise On First Principles by establishing, in typical Platonic fashion, a divine hierarchical triad; but instead of calling these principles by typical Platonic terms like monad, dyad, and world-soul, he calls them “Father,” “Christ,” and “Holy Spirit,” though he does describe these principles using Platonic language. The first of these principles, the Father, is a perfect unity, complete unto Himself, and without body – a purely spiritual mind. Since God the Father is, for Origen, “personal and active,” it follows that there existed with Him, always, an entity upon which to exercise His intellectual activity. This entity is Christ the Son, the Logos, or Wisdom (Sophia), of God, the first emanation of the Father, corresponding to Numenius’ “second god,” as we have seen above (section 2). The third and last principle of the divine triad is the Holy Spirit, who “proceeds from the Son and is related to Him as the Son is related to the Father” (A. Tripolitis 1978, p. 94). Here is Origen explaining the status of the Holy Spirit, in a passage preserved in the original Greek:

The God and Father, who holds the universe together, is superior to every being that exists, for he imparts to each one from his own existence that which each one is; the Son, being less than the Father, is superior to rational creatures alone (for he is second to the Father); the Holy Spirit is still less, and dwells within the saints alone. So that in this way the power of the Father is greater than that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Son is more than that of the Holy Spirit, and in turn the power of the Holy Spirit exceeds that of every other holy being (Fragment 9 [Koetschau] tr. Butterworth 1966, pp. 33-34, and footnote).

This graded hierarchy reveals an allotment of power to the second and third members of the Trinity: the Father’s power is universal, but the Son’s corresponds only to rational creatures, while the Spirit’s power corresponds strictly to the “saints” or those who have achieved salvation. Such a structure of divine influence on the created realm is found much later in the system of the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus (see J. Dillon, in G. Vesey, ed. 1989).

b. Souls and their Fall

According to Origen, God’s first creation was a collectivity of rational beings which he calls logika. “Although Origen speaks of the logika as being created, they were not created in time. Creation with respect to them means that they had a beginning, but not a temporal one” (Tripolitis 1978, p. 94). Further, Origen explains that the number of these rational beings is necessarily limited, since an infinite creation would be incomprehensible, and unworthy of God. These souls were originally created in close proximity to God, with the intention that they should explore the divine mysteries in a state of endless contemplation. They grew weary of this intense contemplation, however, and lapsed, falling away from God and into an existence on their own terms, apart from the divine presence and the wisdom to be found there. This fall was not, it must be understood, the result of any inherent imperfection in the creatures of God, rather, it was the result of a misuse of the greatest gift of God to His creation: freedom. The only rational creature who escaped the fall and remained with God is the “soul of Christ” (Origen, On First Principles 2.6.5; Tripolitis 1978, p. 96). This individual soul is indicative of the intended function of all souls, i.e., to reveal the divine mystery in unique ways, insofar as the meaning of this mystery is deposited within them, as theandric (God-human) potentiality, to be drawn out and revealed through co-operation with God (On First Principles 2.9.2-8). As Origen explains, the soul of Christ was no different from that of any of the souls that fell away from God, for Christ’s soul possessed the same potential for communion with God as that of all other souls. What distinguished the soul of Christ from all others – and what preserved Him from falling away – was His supreme act of free choice, to remain immersed in the divinity.

What are now souls (psukhê) began as minds, and through boredom or distraction grew “cold” (psukhesthai) as they moved away from the “divine warmth” (On First Principles 2.8.3). Thus departing from God, they came to be clothed in bodies, at first of “a fine ethereal and invisible nature,” but later, as souls fell further away from God, their bodies changed “from a fine, ethereal and invisible body to a body of a coarser and more solid state. The purity and subtleness of the body with which a soul is enveloped depends upon the moral development and perfection of the soul to which it is joined. Origen states that there are varying degrees of subtleness even among the celestial and spiritual bodies” (Tripolitis 1978, p. 106). When a soul achieves salvation, according to Origen, it ceases being a soul, and returns to a state of pure “mind” or understanding. However, due to the fall, now “no rational spirit can ever exist without a body” (Tripolitis 1978, p. 114), but the bodies of redeemed souls are “spiritual bodies,” made of the purest fire (see A. Scott 1991, Chapter 9).

c. Multiple Ages, Metempsychosis, and the Restoration of All

Origen did not believe in the eternal suffering of sinners in hell. For him, all souls, including the devil himself, will eventually achieve salvation, even if it takes innumerable ages to do so; for Origen believed that God’s love is so powerful as to soften even the hardest heart, and that the human intellect – being the image of God – will never freely choose oblivion over proximity to God, the font of Wisdom Himself. Certain critics of Origen have claimed that this teaching undermines his otherwise firm insistence on free will, for, these critics argue, the souls must maintin the freedom to ultimately reject or accept God, or else free will becomes a mere illusion. What escapes these critics is the fact that Origen’s conception of free will is not our own; he considered freedom in the Platonic sense of the ability to choose the good. Since evil is not the polar opposite of good, but rather simply the absence of good – and thus having no real existence – then to ‘choose’ evil is not to make a conscious decision, but to act in ignorance of the measure of all rational decision, i.e., the good. Origen was unable to conceive of a God who would create souls that were capable of dissolving into the oblivion of evil (non-being) for all eternity. Therefore, he reasoned that a single lifetime is not enough for a soul to achieve salvation, for certain souls require more education or ‘healing’ than others. So he developed his doctrine of multiple ages, in which souls would be re-born, to experience the educative powers of God once again, with a view to ultimate salvation. This doctrine, of course, implies some form of transmigration of souls or metempsychosis. Yet Origen’s version of metempsychosis was not the same as that of the Pythagoreans, for example, who taught that the basest of souls will eventually become incarnated as animals. For Origen, some sort of continuity between the present body, and the body in the age to come, was maintained (Jerome, Epistle to Avitus 7, quoting Origen; see also Commentary on Matthew 11.17). Origen did not, like many of his contemporaries, degrade the body to the status of an unwanted encrustation imprisoning the soul; for him, the body is a necessary principle of limitation, providing each soul with a unique identity. This is an important point for an understanding of Origen’s epistemology, which is based upon the idea that God educates each soul according to its inherent abilities, and that the abilities of each soul will determine the manner of its knowledge. We may say, then, that the uniqueness of the soul’s body is an image of its uniqueness of mind. This is the first inkling of the development of the concept of the person and personality in the history of Western thought.

The restoration of all beings (apokatastasis) is the most important concept in Origen’s philosophy, and the touchstone by which he judges all other theories. His concept of universal restoration is based on equally strong Scriptural and Hellenistic philosophical grounds and is not original, as it can be traced back to Heraclitus, who stated that “the beginning and end are common” (Fragment B 103, tr. J. Barnes 1987, p. 115). Considering that Origen’s later opponents based their charges of heresy largely on this aspect of his teaching, it is surprising to see how well-grounded in scripture this doctrine really is. Origen’s main biblical proof-text is 1 Corinthians 15:25-28, especially verse 28, which speaks of the time “when all things shall be subdued unto him [Christ], then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all” (KJV, my emphasis). This scriptural notion of God being “all in all” (panta en pasin) is a strong theological support for his theory of apokatastasis. There are, of course, numerous other passages in scripture that contradict this notion, but we must remember that Origen’s strength resided in his philosophical ability to use reason and dialectic in support of humane doctrines, not in the ability to use scripture in support of dogmatical and anti-humanistic arguments. Origen imagined salvation not in terms of the saved rejoicing in heaven and the damned suffering in hell, but as a reunion of all souls with God.

4. Important Themes in Origen’s Philosophy

While Origen’s lengthy treatise On First Principles contains numerous discussions of a wide variety of issues relevant to the Christianity of his day, as well as to broader philosophical concerns, certain key themes do emerge that are of universal and timeless value for philosophy. These themes are: free will; the educational value of history; and the infinity and eternal motion (becoming) of human beings.

a. Free Will

Origen’s conception of freedom, as discussed above, was not the same as modern conceptions. This is not to say that his conception was wrong, of course. For Origen recognized freedom only in reason, in rationality, which is precisely the ability to recognize and embrace the good, which is for him God. Irrationality is ignorance, the absence of a conception of the good. The ignorant person cannot be held responsible for his ignorance, except to the extent that he has been lazy, not applying himself to the cultivation of reason. The moral dimension of this conception of freedom is that ignorance is not to be punished, but remedied through education. Punishment, understood in the punative sense, is of no avail and will even lead to deeper ignorance and sin, as the punished soul grows resentful, not understanding why he is being punished. Origen firmly believed that the knowledge of the good (God) is itself enough to remove all taint of sin and ignorance from souls. A ‘freedom’ to embrace evil (the absence of good) would have made no sense to Origen who, as a Platonist, identified evil with enslavement and goodness with freedom. The soul who has seen the good, he argued, will not fall into ignorance again, for the good is inspiring and worthy of eternal contemplation (see Commentary on Romans 5.10.15).

b. Education and History

Origen may rightfully be called the first philosopher of history, for, like Hegel, he understood history as a process involving the participation of persons in grand events leading to an eventual culmination or ‘end of history’. Unlike mainstream Christian eschatology, Origen did not understand the end of history as the final stage of a grand revelation of God, but rather as the culmination of a human-divine (co-operative) process, in which the image and likeness of God (humanity) is re-united with its source and model, God Himself (see Against Celsus 4.7; On First Principles 2.11.5, 2.11.7; Tripolitis 1978, p. 111). This is accomplished through education of souls who, having fallen away from God, are now sundered from the divine presence and require a gradual re-initiation into the mysteries of God. Such a reunion must not be accomplished by force, for God will never, Origen insists, undermine the free will of His creatures; rather, God will, over the course of numerous ages if need be, educate souls little by little, leading them eventually, by virtue of their own growing responsiveness, back to Himself, where they will glory in the uncovering of the infinite mysteries of the eternal godhead (On First Principles 2.11.6-7).

c. Eternal Motion of Souls

A common motif in Platonism during, before, and after Origen’s time is salvific stasis, or the idea that the soul will achieve complete rest and staticity when it finally ascends to a contemplation of the good. We notice this idea early on in Plato, who speaks in the Republic (517c-d, 519c-e) of a state of pure contemplation from which the philosopher is only wrenched by force or persuasion. In Origen’s own time, Plotinus developed his notion of an ‘about-face’ (epistrophê) of the soul resulting in an instant union of the soul with its divine principle, understood as an idealized, changeless form of contemplation, allowing for no dynamism or personal development (see Enneads 4.3.32, 4.8.4, for example). Influenced indirectly by Plotinus, and more directly by later Neoplatonists (both Christian and pagan), the Christian theologian St. Maximus the Confessor elaborated a systematic philosophical theology culminating in an eschatology in which the unique human person was replaced by the overwhelming, transcendent presence of God (see Chapters on Knowledge 2.88). Origen managed to maintain the transcendentality of God on the one hand, and the dynamic persistence of souls in being on the other. He did this by defining souls not by virtue of their intellectual content (or, in the Plotinian sense, for example, by virtue of their ‘prior’ or higher, constitutive principle) but rather by their ability to engage in a finite manner with the infinite God. This engagement is constitutive of the soul’s existence, and guarantees its uniqueness. Each soul engages uniquely with God in contemplating divine mysteries according to its innate ability, and this engagement persists for all eternity, for the mysteries of the godhead are inexhaustible, as is the enthusiastic application of the souls’ intellectual ability.

5. Origen’s Importance in the History of Philosophy

Throughout this article, Origen’s importance has largely been linked to his melding of philosophical insights with elucidations of various aspects of the Christian fatih. Yet his importance for Hellenistic philosophy is marked, and though not quite as pervasive as his influence on Christian thought, is nevertheless worth a few brief remarks. His role in the formation of Christian doctrine is more prominent, yet, because of its problematical nature, will be treated of only briefly.

a. Hellenistic Philosophy

Origen’s debt to Hellenistic (Greek) philosophy is quite obvious; his influence on the development of later pagan philosophy is – at least from the perspective of most contemporary scholarship – rather less obvious, but it is there. His trinitarian doctrine, for example, consisted of a gradation of influence beginning with the Father, whose influence was of the most general, universal kind, binding together all things; the influence of the Son extended strictly to sentient beings; the Holy Spirit’s influence extended only to the ‘elect’ or saints who had already achieved salvation (Dillon, in D.J. O’Meara, ed., 1982, p. 20; see also On First Principles 1.3.5). This conception found later expression in Proclus’ Elements of Theology (Proposition 57), where he elucidates this formulation: “Every cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms” (tr. Dodds). For Origen, the pre-existent souls, through their fall, gave rise to a history over which both the Father and the Son came to preside, while the Holy Spirit only enters into human reality to effect a salvific re-orientation toward God that is already the result of an achieved history. The Holy Spirit, then, may be understood as the final cause, the preparatory causes of which are the Father and Son, the mutual begetters of history. A bit later, the pagan philosopher Iamblichus reversed this Origenian notion, claiming that the influence of the divine became stronger and more concentrated the further it penetrated into created reality, extending in its pure power even to stones and plants. In this sense, the Holy Spirit, limited as it is (according to Origen) to interaction with the saints alone, gives way to the universal power of the Father, which extends to the furthest reaches of reality. Iamblichus saw no reason to divide the divinity into persons or emanative effects; rather, he saw the divinity as operative, in varying degrees, at every level of reality. At the lowest level, however, this power is most effective, imparting power to plants and stones, and providing support for the theurgical practice advocated by Iamblichus (Olympiodorus, Commentary on Alcibiades I, 115A; Psellus, Chaldaean Expositions 1153a10-11; Dillon, ed. O’Meara 1982, p. 23).

b. Christianity

Origen’s ideas, most notably those in the treatise On First Principles, gave rise to a movement in the Christian Church known as Origenism. From the third through the sixth centuries this movement was quite influential, especially among the monastics, and was given articulate – if excessively codified form – by the theologian Evagrius Ponticus (c. 345-400 C.E.). It is to be noted that the spirit of philosophical inquiry exemplified by Origen was largely absent from the movement bearing his name. A far more creative use of Origen’s concepts and themes was made by Gregory of Nyssa (d. ca. 386 C.E.), who adopted Origen’s doctrine of apokatastasis or “restoration of all things.” Gregory was also responsible for articulating more clearly than did Origen the notion that redeemed souls will remain in a state of dynamic intellectual activity (see Gregory of Nyssa, Catechetical Oration, esp. Chapters 26 and 35). After the posthumous condemnation of Origen (and Origenism) in the fifth century, it became increasingly difficult for mainstream theologians to make use of his work. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (5th or 6th Century C.E.) drew upon Neoplatonic philosophy, especially Proclus (411-485 C.E.) and Iamblichus (ca. 240-325 C.E.), and though he followed in Origen’s footsteps in this use of pagan wisdom, he never mentioned his predecessor by name. In the seventh century, Maximus the Confessor (ca. 580-662), who may be called the last great Christian Neoplatonist, set about revising Origen’s doctrines in a manner more acceptable to the theological climate of the early Byzantine Church. Maximus changed the historicism of Origen into a more introspective, personal struggle to attain the divine vision through asceticism and prayer, the result being a total subsumption of the person by the godhead. This was Maximus’ vision of salvation: the replacement of the ego by the divine presence (see L. Thunberg 1985, p. 89; also Maximus, Chapters on Knowledge 2.88). While there is much that may be called brilliant and even inspiring in Maximus’ philosophical theology, this loss of the centrality of the person – as unique, unrepeatable entity – in the cosmic process of salvation led to the loss of a sense of co-operation of humanity and God, and sapped Christianity of the intellectual vigor that it displayed in the period leading up to the establishment of a theocratical Byzantine state.

Thankfully, Origen’s legacy was not lost. He was an inspiration to the Renaissance Humanists and, more recently, to certain Existentialist Christian theologians, notably Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948) whose insistence on the absolute autonomy and nobility of the person in the face of all objectifying reality is an echo across the ages of the humanism of Origen. Berdyaev himself admits Origen’s influence on his thought (as well as that of Gregory of Nyssa) and insists that the doctrine of hell and the eternal suffering of sinners is not compatible with authentic Christianity. He also places a great importance on history, and even broaches a modern, de-mythologized conception of metempsychosis in terms of a universal, shared history of which all persons are a part, regardless of their temporal specificity. History, according to Berdyaev (and in this he follows Origen) binds all of humanity together. No soul will be saved in isolation; all must be saved together, or not be saved at all. Berdyaev wrote numerous works, a few of the most important are Slavery and Freedom (Eng. tr. 1944), The Beginning and the End(Eng. tr.1952), and Truth and Revelation (Eng. tr. 1962).

6. Concluding Summary

Origen was an innovator in an era when innovation, for Christians, was a luxury ill-afforded. He drew upon pagan philosophy in an effort to elucidate the Christian faith in a manner acceptable to intellectuals, and he succeeded in converting many gifted pagan students of philosophy to his faith. He was also a great humanist, who believed that all creatures will eventually achieve salvation, including the devil himself. Origen did not embrace the dualism of Gnosticism, nor that of the more primitive expressions of the Christian faith still extant in his day. Rather, he took Christianity to a higher level, finding in it a key to the perfection of the intellect or mind, which is what all souls are in their pure form. The restoration of all souls to a purely intellectual existence was Origen’s faith, and his philosophy was based upon such a faith. In this, he is an heir to Socrates and Plato, but he also brought a new conception into philosophy – that of the creative aspect of the soul, as realized in history, the culmination of which is salvation, after which follows an eternal delving into the deep mysteries of God.

7. References and Further Reading

Bibliography

Selected Works by Origen in English Translation

ñ   Origen, Against Celsus, tr. F. Crombie (The Ante-Nicene Fathers 4; Michigan: Eerdmans 1979, reprint).

ñ   _____, On First Principles, tr. G.W. Butterworth (New York: Harper and Row 1966).

ñ   _____, Commentary on John, tr. A. Menzies (The Ante-Nicene Fathers 10; Michigan: Eerdmans 1978, reprint).

ñ   _____, Commentary on Matthew, tr. J. Patrick (The Ante-Nicene Fathers 10; Michigan: Eerdmans 1978, reprint).

ñ   _____, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Books 1-5), tr. T.P. Scheck (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 2001).

ñ   _____, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Books 6-10), tr. T.P. Scheck (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 2002).

Other Sources

ñ   Berdyaev, Nicholas, The Beginning and the End, tr. R.M. French (New York: Harper and Brothers 1952).

ñ   _____, Slavery and Freedom, tr. R.M. French (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1944).

ñ   _____, Truth and Revelation, tr. R.M. French (New York: Collier Books 1962).

ñ   Chadwick, H., Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (New York: Oxford University Press 1966).

ñ   Crouzel, H., Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian, tr. A.S. Worrall (T.&T. Clark Ltd. 1989).

ñ   Dillon, J.M., The Middle Platonists(Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1977).

ñ   Hardy, E.R., Christology of the Later Fathers (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press 1954).

ñ   Jonas, H., “Origen’s Metaphysics of Free Will, Fall, and Salvation: A ‘Divine Comedy’ of the Universe,” in Philosophical Essays: From Ancient Creed to Technological Man (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall 1974).

ñ   Kannengiesser, C., Petersen, W.L., eds., Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1988).

ñ   Kelly, J.N.D., Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row 1978).

ñ   Louth, A., Maximus the Confessor (New York: Routledge 1996).

ñ   Luibheid, C., Rorem, P., tr., Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press 1987).

ñ   Meyendorff, J., Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press 1975).

ñ   Murphy, F.X., “Evagrius Ponticus and Origenism,” in R. Hanson and H. Crouzel, ed., Origeniana Tertia (1981).

ñ   O’Meara, D.J., ed., Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (New York: State University of New York Press 1982).

ñ   Pelikan, J., Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New Haven: Yale University Press 1993).

ñ   _____, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 2: “The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1974).

ñ   Scott, A., Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991).

ñ   Shaw, G., Theurgy and the Soul: The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1995).

ñ   Siorvanes, L., Proclus: Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press 1996).

ñ   Stevenson, J., ed. A New Eusebius: Documents Illustrative of the History of the Church to A.D. 337 (London: S.P.C.K. 1957).

ñ   Tatakis, B., Byzantine Philosophy, tr. N.J. Moutafakis (Indianapolis: Hackett 2003).

ñ   Thunberg, L., Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of St. Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press 1985).

ñ   Trigg, J.W., Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century Church (Atlanta: John Knox Press 1983).

ñ   Tripolitis, A., The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen (New York: Libra 1978).

ñ   Werner, M., The Formation of Christian Dogma, tr. S.G.F. Brandon ( Harper and Brothers 1957).

ñ   Williamson, G.A., tr., Eusebius, The History of the Church (New York: Penguin Books 1965).

ñ   Zeller, E., Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, tr. L.R. Palmer (New York: Meridian Books 1955).

Author Information

Edward Moore
Email: patristics@gmail.com
St. Elias School of Orthodox Theology

Last updated: May 2, 2005 | Originally published: December/20/2003

Article printed from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu/origen-of-alexandria/

Copyright © The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. All rights reserved.

Origen of Alexandria and apokatastasis: Some Notes on the Development of a Noble Notion

Ориген Александрийский и апокатастасис: Некоторые замечания относительно великодушной заметки

Author: Edward Moore
Quodlibet Journal: Volume 5 Number 1, January 2003
ISSN: 1526-6575

Origen of Alexandria (185-254 C.E.) was the greatest humanist theologian of the early Patristic era. He was active during a period of great intellectual confusion among Christians, when Gnosticism was the dominant intellectual force, and nascent orthodoxy was struggling to find a voice. Origen held a firm conviction that not a single rational being will be lost to the darkness of ignorance and sin. Even the most recalcitrant sinner, he argued, will eventually attain salvation. The fire of punishment is not an instrument of eternal torment, but of divine instruction and correction. Since the soul is essentially rational, it will eventually be convinced of the truth of the divine pedagogy. When this conviction arises, salvation and deification will follow. The word used to describe this universal salvation was apokatastasis, "restoration of all things."

This term occurs in only a single New Testament passage;[1] its provenance is not intrinsically Christian or even Jewish, but Hellenistic, and bound up with the cosmology and anthropology of the era - a system of belief which Origen, in his day, was obliged to undermine in the interest of Christian teaching. Before examining the apokatastasis doctrine in the works of Origen, we would do well to look back to the Hellenistic antecedents, which are to be found among the Stoic philosophers, Greco-Egyptian astrologers, the Hermetic school, and Gnostics.

I. Pre-Christian Ideas Concerning apokatastasis

The earliest philosophical occurrence of the term apokatastasis is to be found in Empedocles, where it refers to the eternal relation of Love and Strife in the maintenance of the cosmic order. [2] The term also occurs in the pseudo-Platonic treatise Axiochus in reference to the "revolutions of the stars." [3] But this is a later, Hellenistic-era work, not from Plato's pen, and therefore representative of later conceptions.

The first truly conceptual use of this term is to be found in the writings - now only fragmentary - of the early Stoic thinkers, particularly Chrysippus, who had a special attachment to Babylonian astronomy, with its theory of cosmic cycles and eternal recurrence. [4] Already in Plato, however, we find a notion of distinct cosmic cycles or ages; [5] but a rigorous idea of eternal recurrence, involving a notion of cosmic culmination and reconstitution, was articulated for the first time by the Stoics.

Stoicism

The Stoic idea was based upon an astronomical doctrine according to which the return (apokatastasis) of the planets to their proper "celestial signs" initiates the conflagration (ekpurôsis), which is the reduction of the entire cosmos to its primal element (fire), after which follows the rebirth of all existing things. [6] This destruction and rebirth is connected effectively with the divine logos that guides the cosmos and preserves it in stability (katastasis). "Universal reason," according to the Stoics, eventually "dries up everything" and absorbs and contains all unique expressions of be(com)ing. [7]

According to the Stoics, there is no room for autonomous expression outside the closed system of the cosmos. Each human being, they argued, receives his or her station in life from the divine logos, and a virtuous life consists in merely accepting one's allotted station. The cosmic principle or power responsible for such allotment was identified by the Stoics as heimarmenê ("fate" or "destiny"). It is right and proper for human beings to remain in harmony with this power, they argued, since it stems from divine reason (logos). When the human being attempts to strive against heimarmenê, this "fate" is then experienced as anankê (constraint or necessity). [8]

There were three important responses to this highly influential doctrine in the Hellenistic era: astrology, and the Hermetic and Gnostic schools (which were influenced heavily by astrological theories).

Astrology

While Hellenistic astrology likely developed in a common milieu with Hermeticism and Gnosticism (i.e., in Hellenized Egypt), the former discipline did not develop along the excessively mystical, mythical, and esoteric lines as the latter schools. When Hellenistic astrologers discussed apokatastasis, it was usually in terms of an intra-cosmic process of planetary recurrence and "counter-recurrence" (antapokatastasis), [9] and did not refer to any supra-cosmic event, as did Gnostic and Christian soteriology.

The Hellenistic astrologers adhered to the Stoic model of the universe, and busied themselves with, among other things, calculating the time of the conflagration (ekpurôsis). It was generally agreed that the apokatastasis would occur when all planets aligned in Cancer - this was the signal for the ekpurôsis. Conversely, the alignment of all planets in Capricorn (the sign opposite Cancer) announced the antapokatastasis or "counter-recurrence," which signaled destruction by flood. [10] This general schema was adopted by both Hermeticists and Gnostics, who gave it an anthropological and soteriological frame of reference.

The idea that the world has been, and will again be, subjected to chastisement by flood, followed by fire, is found in the Hermetic Asclepius, a treatise also included - in partial and slightly altered form - in the Nag Hammadi collection of Gnostic texts. While the astrologers were virtually silent regarding the reason or purpose for the conflagration, the Hermetic and Gnostic thinkers were clear in their opinion that this event was directly connected to humanity's wayward existence.

The Hermetic School

The writings comprising the Corpus Hermeticum, produced at different times and by different authors, do not always agree on certain points of doctrine. Yet one dominant theme is the loss of human personality and individuality during the salvific event. [11] In C.H. X.16-18, we encounter a description of the purification of the soul and its donning of a fiery body, in which mind is able to act as the controlling faculty - a task not possible when mind is contained by an earthly body. "For earth cannot bear fire; the whole thing burns even from a little spark; this is why water has spread all around the earth guarding like a fence or a wall against the burning of the fire." [12] Connecting this passage with Greek astrological conceptions, we may say that the Hermetic writer(s) equated apokatastasis with the soul's rupturous departure from the cosmic order, and antapokatastasis with the maintenance of that order.

While the Hermetic writings do contain some "anti-cosmic" passages, the dominant attitude toward the cosmos is one of qualified veneration, realizing that the greatest glory is invisible and intellectual, rather than sensible, but also admitting that the visible cosmos is the best of all possible worlds. [13] The Gnostics, however, refused to grant even this respect to the visible, material cosmos.

Gnosticism

Unlike the Hermetic writers, who believed this cosmos to be an abode of passions and vices that may be overcome with effort, the Gnostics considered the cosmic realm to be a place of enslavement and exile, controlled by an ignorant ruler and his vicious minions, whom the Gnostics identified loosely with the stars and planets.

At first glance, the Gnostic position may seem completely contrary to the Hellenistic spirit, which received its motto from Plato, who declared that humanity exists for the sake of the cosmos, and not the cosmos for the sake of humanity. [14] Yet if one looks deeper, one will realize that the Gnostics simply took Stoicism, astral piety, and sundry other aspects of Hellenistic syncretism, and brought them to a logical - or perhaps illogical - conclusion. This is not to say that the Gnostics were mere eclectics - they most certainly had original ideas of their own, which informed their interpretations of various doctrines. It must also be noted that Gnosticism produced the first great Christian theologians - Basilides, Valentinus, and Ptolemy - who were actively teaching and philosophizing at a time when orthodoxy was still in its infancy. I will now briefly examine apokatastasis in the context of Christian Gnosticism, which will lead us into Origen.

BASILIDES

Basilides (fl. ca. 132-135 C.E.) was heavily influenced by Stoicism and, according to St. Irenaeus, by a certain esoteric brand of Hellenistic astrology. [15] Two versions of his system have come down to us, one preserved by St. Irenaeus, which is rather too simplistic to be authentic, considering that Basilides was famed as a highly original and provocative teacher. [16] The other version is preserved by St. Hippolytus, [17] and contains a highly original account of the apokatastasis, in which the post-restoration maintenance of cosmic order is described as depending upon lower existents' forgetfulness of the higher realm, to which only the "elect" can ascend. For according to Basilides, beings perish when they attempt to transgress the boundaries of their nature. The purpose of the forgetfulness is to prevent naturally inferior beings from striving for a station beyond their nature, and to avoid the suffering attendant upon such improper striving. As J.W. Trigg has remarked: "Basilides' understanding of the meaning of suffering and his recoil from attributing retributive punishment to God provided Origen with a possible inspiration." [18]

The evidence for Basilides' system is scant, since his own words survive only in a few fragments preserved by later writers. According to Origen, Basilides held a doctrine of reincarnation that was identical to the Pythagorean belief that human souls may take on the bodies of animals in future lives. [19] It is possible that Basilides believed in multiple restorations of the cosmos, in a manner akin to the Stoic doctrine of periodic conflagrations. In the absence of sufficient evidence, however, it is impossible to say more about his doctrine.

PTOLEMY

The Gnostic Ptolemy (fl. ca. 136-152? C.E.) was a pupil of Valentinus (ca. 100-175 C.E.), and the greatest systematizer among the Christian Gnostics. A complete account of his system is preserved in St. Irenaeus.20 Concerning the apokatastasis, Ptolemy taught that all matter will be destroyed in a final conflagration. The "spiritual" beings - i.e., the Gnostics who are 'saved by nature' - will be taken up into the invisible, immaterial plêrôma or "fullness," while the merely "animate" or "psychic" beings (those possessing soul but not spirit, including the Demiurge, whom the Gnostics identified as Yahweh) will remain outside the plêrôma in a place called the "midpoint," since it is half-way between the blessed fullness and oblivion.

At this point in the tradition, we have arrived at a notion of complete subjugation of the person to an over-arching cosmic or supra-cosmic process. No longer does the individual life bear meaning in relation to the cosmos, for the cosmos has been denuded of all positive characteristics. In Stoicism, a certain degree of human-divine partnership was admitted; in astrology the cosmic mind was approached by one full of questions, and the human element was maintained; even in Hermeticism, the cosmos served as a proving ground for human intellectual endeavor. But in Gnosticism, all notions of human freedom and autonomy were abandoned in favor of a radical essentialism. Either one was saved by nature or not - no human decision made in the face of Being made any difference. The universe, so argued the Gnostics, belongs to the "elect"; the dark basement of animality belongs to the merely animate or "psychic," who were considered "just" but not "good."

Origen, who fully understood the meaning and intentionality of the tradition which I have elucidated ever-so-briefly here, responded with an assertion that was truly revolutionary. In the absence of human freedom, neither the cosmos nor even God hold any meaning for humanity.

II. The Theologian of Free Will: Origen of Alexandria

Henri Crouzel, in his seminal work on Origen, describes the Alexandrian as "the theologian par excellence of free will." [21] This is indeed a valid assessment; however, we must be very clear on what "free will" meant for Origen, as his understanding of that concept was quite different from our own.

When we speak of "free will" we are often merely referring to the absence of any restrictions on our ability to make decisions. Immanuel Kant, in the third chapter of his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), made the distinction between negative and positive freedom. The former simply means the absence of coercion or outside interference in the decision-making process; the latter means the active, self-regulative, informed decision of a rational being. [22] Neither of these 'modes' of freedom, now so common in popular conception, has a place in Origen's doctrine.

Origen's own idea is perhaps more closely approximated by Jean-Paul Sartre's reflections on freedom, in which he articulates the "paradox of freedom: there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom." And Origen might have added that God created not an essence, but a situation - a situation necessarily involving, nay requiring, freedom. [23] Sartre concurs: "Human freedom precedes essence in man and makes it possible." [24] We will find, as we examine Origen's thought, that he believed God's creation of souls to have been a creation not of essences, but of possibilities.

While Origen believed that the essence of each soul is derived from that soul's free and autonomous activity, [25] he also believed that the soul is not alone. Unlike Kant, who saw freedom only in the absence of any outside influence, Origen recognized the influence of God as the key to true freedom - as opposed to a strictly self-reliant freedom, the faulty exercise of which leads only to slavery. The guard against such a perversion of freedom, and a lapse into its opposite, according to Origen, is divine providence (pronoia). [26]

The Role of Providence in the Maintenance of Freedom

Origen did not understand freedom as the ability to destroy oneself. His doctrine of apokatastasis was based upon this firm conviction. He believed that the soul 'chooses' (or lapses into) the absence of Good only through ignorance, and not through active malignancy. [27] Yet ignorance is not, according to Origen, simply a result of lack of education - it is the symptom of the obtrusion of non-existence upon our being-with-God. This 'non-existence' is complacency, boredom, stasis: a relinquishing of one's energeia to the inertia of existence. [28] Existence is a source of meaning and knowledge only when it is engaged. [29] We engage existence, according to Origen, only by attending to the principle of reason that established this existence as the locus of possibility for a free and autonomous soul. [30]

Origen believed that the results of human free will were foreseen by God, and utilized by Him for the purpose of leading humanity's engagement with existence to the best possible conclusion. God's "foreknowledge" (prognôsis), Origen insists, is not the cause of events occurring in this world, but simply the recognition of these events as they relate either to the Good or to non-existence. [31]

Yet Origen recognizes the fact that God has a plan for humanity - a plan involving the establishment of ultimate freedom. This ultimate freedom is a freedom in which the possibility of freedom's negation is not present. [32] Origen could not rationalize the standard Christian idea that certain souls will inevitably fail to achieve salvation, and be plunged into eternal torment. If God created all souls equally, with freedom and reason, how could He possibly abandon these souls to the negation of that original possibility for perfection?

Origen, following a standard philosophical conception extending back to Plato, believed that the absence of reason (logos) is slavery. [33] The one who has abandoned reason may believe he or she is free, but the opposite, in fact, is the case: such a being is enslaved to ignorance without knowing it. Only the divine dialectic, which both Plato and Plotinus called the greatest tool of philosophy, [34] could lead such a soul out of the darkness of ignorance back toward the light of freedom and knowledge. Unlike Plato, however, Origen did not conceive of knowledge in the sense of an all-encompassing object of rapt, ecstatic contemplation. Rather, for Origen, knowledge was understood in a dynamic sense: as a process of ever-increasing capacity to delve into and grasp the divine concepts upon which the creation is founded. [35] This is true freedom: to remain in a constant state of growth, of upward motion toward God. Providence is the pedagogical power that leads us along this path of freedom. Since this freedom involves perpetual motion, if you will, it also implies the possibility for another fall - at least theoretically. [36] This is one of the main difficulties in Origen's 'un-systematic' theology, for it leads to the implication that the Incarnation may have been in vain. This problem is removed, however, when we consider carefully what justice and love meant for Origen, and how these two seemingly exclusive concepts were united in his doctrine of salvific paideia.

The Dialectic of Love and Justice

We have seen how Providence, for Origen, is not coercive, but instructive. This idea serves as the basis for his doctrine of apokatastasis, insofar as Origen declares that all souls will eventually be brought freely - i.e., of their own accord - into communion with God, to be held there not by compulsion, but by love. [37]

Certain contemporaries of Origen could not accept this idea - such as the followers of Marcion of Sinope (fl. ca. 144-160 C.E.) - and posited a rather artificial distinction between a "good" or loving God, and a "just" God. Origen easily, if somewhat sophistically, refuted this assertion:

If justice is a different thing from goodness, then, since evil is the opposite of good, and injustice of justice, injustice will doubtless be something else than an evil; and as, in your [i.e., the Marcionites] opinion, the just man is not good, so neither will the unjust man be wicked; and again, as the good man is not just, so the wicked man also will not be unjust. [38]

However, the crux of Origen's argument resides not in such logical niceties, but in his conviction that justice (dikê) is paideutic, not retributive.

The argument of contemporary theologians against Origen's doctrine is not much different than that of the Marcionites. In a recent article, Matthew C. Steenberg writes:

[T]he doctrine of Universal Salvation [apokatastasis] cannot be faithfully paired with the more patristic notions of free will or final judgement, even though Origen energetically defends both, for he described 'judgement' solely as a tool for teaching, and thus removed from it any real sense of justice. He exaggerated the love of God to a degree that downplayed His righteousness: two features which the Church has been insistent to bring together in its teachings, rather than to separate. [39]

The problem with Steenberg's conclusion is that he does not bother to offer a rigorous definition of justice - unless, of course, he is implying that justice = retribution (which I cannot accept).

The Greek term dikê is best defined as "right conduct toward others in which one gives them what is proper." [40] Yet what is "proper" to someone is not given by nature, but by convention (to borrow the old Sophistic distinction). Our situation in the world, not some over-arching (or fundamental) ideal of conduct, determines our relationship toward others. As Origen has stated clearly, in a very 'existential' passage of the De Principiis:

[T]he language of the apostle does not assert that to will evil is of God, or to will good is of Him (and similarly with respect to doing better and worse); but that to will in a general way, and to run in a general way, (are from Him). [41]

In other words, as Sartre declared, "it is therefore our freedom which constitutes the limits which it will subsequently encounter." [42]

These limits of freedom, as Thomas Hobbes has explained, are products of a "covenant" - i.e., of agreements drawn up between individuals, yet determined and ratified, as it were, by some higher "coercive Power." This "Power," according to Hobbes, is not concerned with human action toward itself, but rather with a human being's relation to his or her fellows. Like Anaximander, who saw justice only in terms of mutual relations, and not in relation to the transcendent source of all, the apeiron, [43] Hobbes saw justice as a product of mutual trust based upon a covenantal ideal:

[W]here no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of Covenant. [44]

According to Origen, we have entered into a covenant of mutual love with God. The terms of this covenant are simple: strive for the divine Eros that eventually leads the soul to absolute freedom in knowledge, and God will aid that soul according to its degree of enthusiasm. However, if the soul turns away from this striving, God will simply refuse to aid the soul, and whatever befalls the soul will not be from God, but rather from the soul's own lack of insight.

If providence, then, is our guide along the path of freedom, justice is the principle governing the concrete situations that we encounter - through the exercise of our freedom - as we proceed toward God (or not). These concrete situations, while resulting from our own free choices, are nevertheless part of God's plan for governing the universe. This does not mean that God pre-ordained all things, with the result that human freedom is an illusion. Rather:

among all the things God foreordains in accordance with what He has seen concerning each deed of our freedom, there has been foreordained according to merit for each motion of our freedom what will meet it from providence and still cohere with the chain of future events. And so, God's foreknowledge is not the cause of everything that will come to be, even of our freedom when we are made active by our own impulse. For even if we entertain the supposition that God does not know what will come to be, we do not for this reason lose the power of acting in different ways and of willing certain things. But if God takes the order for the governance of the universe from His foreknowledge, then all the more is our individual freedom useful for the ordering of the world. [45]

To put this in a simple formula, we may say that humanity's pre-existent freedom, rather than God's overarching logos, is responsible for the state of the cosmos. This is human-divine co-operation par excellence - and therefore the highest expression of Love.

Pedagogy not Punishment: Origen's Doctrine of Multiple Ages

Origen's interpretation of the biblical phrase "foundation of the world" [46] hinged upon the Greek term translated as "foundation," katabolê, which also meant "to cast downwards." Following the latter meaning, Origen declared that the material cosmos is the result of a fall from a primordial state of blessedness shared equally by all rational beings or 'minds'. [47] As each mind grew apart from God, it began to grow cold (psukhesthai) and became a soul (psukhê). [48] The blessed angels are those minds that have remained closest to God, followed closely by the stars and planets. Human beings and the malignant demons are the ones who have fallen the farthest. Origen did not believe that the fall was an intra-cosmic event; rather, he held that the cosmos is the result of this primordial fall.

Joseph W. Trigg has aptly remarked that "[t]he fall, for Origen, did not impair an already existing material world but brought it into existence. The material world for him is God's provision for rational creatures who have failed to abide with God." [49] Rather than being a prison in which souls are unjustly contained, as the Gnostics insisted, or a mere shadow or image of the pure intelligible realm, as the Platonists believed, the cosmos, for Origen, is a realm distinctly tailored to (and by) the existential situation of free rational beings. However, far from being a neutral realm, the cosmos is a tool - the most powerful tool - of divine pedagogy; and although cosmic existence does not negate human freedom, Origen makes it quite clear that the operative will in the cosmos is not that of the various rational beings dwelling therein, but of God.

Yet Origen does admit, as we have seen, that the freedom of rational beings precludes any type of predestination. God does not compel beings to respond to His will; He gradually instructs these rational beings in the truth that eventually "forces itself upon us." [50] The beauty of Origen's theory is that this truth is not forced upon us in a direct and violent manner, but is gradually revealed to us as an intelligible (or rational) as well as an existential verity. The unity of 'thought' (logos endiathetos) and 'expression' (logos prophorikos), for Origen, is not a supra-essential, static unity, but a unification that is the result of a long process of becoming. As in later Neo-Platonic triadic systems (such as that of Proclus) where Being, as Hegel remarked, is not a "principle or purely abstract moment" but a "concrete form" or 'subsistent result' of a process of becoming or expression, [51] Origen's system locates Being at the pinnacle of rational striving.

But this pinnacle is not a point of staticity or repose; it is the flowering of the intellect, an emergence from bondage. The desire to persist in existence as a self-constitutive finite being is the source of the binding that blinds us to our full potential. Such blindness does not, according to Origen, result in our eternal damnation; instead, it issues forth (in) other ages (aiônes) in which we again receive the epistrophic call, with the accompanying 'custom-crafted' exigencies that serve as our paideutic partners.

These ages are not programmatically bestowed upon us as though they were divine curricula. Origen never loses sight of the principle of co-operation between humanity and divinity. Just as there are many different levels of souls - i.e., differing degrees according to the amount of 'cooling off' that took place after the initial falling-away (katabolê) - so there are many ages, each one offering an opportunity for gradual "perfection" and understanding:

[T]he process of amendment and correction will take place imperceptibly in the individual instances during the lapse of countless and unmeasured ages, some outstripping others, and tending by a swifter course towards perfection, while others again follow close at hand, and some again a long way behind; and thus, through the numerous and uncounted orders of progressive beings who are being reconciled to God from a state of enmity, the last enemy is finally reached, who is called death, so that he may also be destroyed, and no longer be an enemy. [52]

This is the stage of the "all in all," when becoming is completed and the pure possibility of freedom-in-being emerges for the first time, as an existential possibility.

The Restoration of All Things

As we have already seen, Origen held a doctrine of the pre-existence of souls with God in a primordial state of purity preceding the fall. It is possible, however not conclusive, that Origen conceived of the Church as the concrete and exemplary restoration of this originary unity of souls. [53] In this final section of my paper, I will argue that Origen did indeed conceive of the earthly Church as the temporal restoration of the original 'cosmic' Church that existed before the fall.

The Gnostic Tripartite Tractate, which certain scholars have suggested contains Origenistic elements, includes a section explaining the nature of the Church and its relation to the Son. [54] While the general structure of the Gnostic text bears some similarity to Origen's speculative primal cosmology, it differs in one important regard: the former excludes the 'material' (hulikos) beings from eternal salvation, while Origen finds a place for all beings, even ignorant sinners, in the "all in all."

In contradistinction to the Gnostics, Origen refused to categorize human beings on the basis of perceived spiritual traits. Although a Platonist, Origen was less a philosopher of Being than of Becoming. Like Empedocles and especially Anaximander, Origen recognized truth in motion, in process, and not in the static repose of 'being-t/here' (Da-sein). [55] For this reason, Origen was able to find an essential place in the salvific schema even for those who - whether willingly, knowingly, or not - remain outside the Church. As Origen explains, these existents are neither "vessels of wrath" nor "vessels of mercy," but vessels of usefulness, perhaps, or for some other mysterious function known only to God. [56] He even goes so far as to insist that the polygamist will find a place in God's mansion, provided he "calls on the name of the Lord," though he must not hope to be "crowned in glory." [57]

We may easily recognize, in such a sentiment, the firm belief that no life is wasted, that no existence is for naught. This is, at first glance, a humanistic, ethical sentiment, and not necessarily worthy of full theological merit. However, when we examine carefully Origen's writings, we notice a very clear and precise program consisting of a theoretical reconciliation of what was, what is, and what shall be. The fact that Origen did not place the burden of universal salvation solely on the shoulders of God, but found a crucial place for human freedom and informed endeavor, shows that he was attuned to the existential nuances of human-divine co-operation. It is important to note that these 'nuances' are the result of human endeavor, and not of divine fiat or error. The terms of our existence here in the cosmos are our own; we do not dwell in a divinely-ordained arena of possibility.

These points being considered, we must remark that Origen, for all his humanistic, free-will pronunciamentoes, nevertheless recognized God and His primordiality as the locus of equiprimordiality (between divine economy and human existence) in which the human soul first took wing. In other words, the human souls that pre-existed with God differed from Him only in their status as created beings, while God is eternal and uncreated. This is an ontological state in which both God and humanity are implicated.

In Book 1, chapter 4 of the De Principiis, Origen clearly states the ontological and cosmological underpinnings of his theory of apokatastasis.

[T]he end is always like the beginning: and, therefore, as there is one end to all things, so ought we to understand that there was one beginning; and as there is one end to many things, so there spring from one beginning many differences and varieties, which again, through the goodness of God, and by subjection to Christ, and through the unity of the Holy Spirit, are recalled to one end, which is like unto the beginning. [58]

The intention of this passage is clearly not ethical or humanistic, but cosmological. It belongs to a distinctly Middle Platonic school of theory, heavily informed by Stoic conceptions. So in the last analysis, the question arises whether or not Origen was bending Christian doctrine to fit into his already adopted Platonic framework. This is a perennial question in Origen scholarship, and one not easily answered, especially in the confines of this short paper. However, I think Origen's adoption of Platonic and Stoic conceptions is not gratuitous, but rather based upon an ethical foundation in his thought that guided all of his speculations. Further, I believe that did he not adopt these ideas as much as he adapted them to his own unique program.

The Gnostics, we must recall, made heavy use of Stoic and Platonic ideas as well, yet Origen found their conclusions to be odious. Particularly offensive to Origen was the idea that certain human beings are destined for destruction. According to the Gnostics, these were the beings who were not granted the special gift of gnôsis. Only those possessing this gift were said to be members of the cosmic Church. While Origen did indeed hold a rather Gnostic-style (or 'essentialist') view of the collective pre-existence of souls, he differed in that he did not view this existence as static and complete in itself, but rather as an open opportunity for education in the mysteries of God. When these souls fell, according to Origen, they did not foil God's plan for a paideia that would result in perfect likenesses of Himself; the fall simply caused God to go to 'plan B,' as it were - i.e., the gradual and sometimes even painful instruction of souls over the course of countless ages, until these souls finally accepted the truth and returned to a state of intimate union with and likeness to God.

In all of this, Origen's focus was less upon individual souls than it was on the collectivity of souls comprising the Church which, for him (as for the biblical writers in general) is understood as the "body of Christ." As Verbrugge has explained, Origen insisted upon the necessity for unity among believers, since a believer who falls away or lapses into error can negatively effect the entire body of the Church. [59] However, this idea, far from turning Origen into an intolerant inquisitor, actually inspired him (in my opinion) to ever greater levels of tolerance - a development which led him to flirt with heresy, and which contributed to his later condemnation during the Origenist crisis of the fifth century.

Prompted by his idea of the pre-existence of souls, I believe that Origen came to view the mission of the earthly, temporal Church in terms of a gathering up of all lost, fallen souls into a unity resembling that which subsisted primordially. The apokatastasis, then, is perhaps best understood as the culmination of such a process of gathering souls together in a unity of faith. Origen provides a clear explanation of his thinking on this point:

Now what he [St. Paul] said, 'the redemption of our body,' I think points to the body of the Church as a whole, as he says elsewhere, 'But you are the body of Christ and members individually.' So then, the Apostle is hoping that the whole body of the Church will be redeemed, and he does not consider it possible for the things that are perfect to be given to the individual members unless the entire body has been gathered unto one. [60]

I believe we are correct to interpret this last line as a reference to the apokatastasis. Since Origen, as we have seen, places human souls at a level of equiprimordiality with the godhead, it follows that he would view the Church, the "body of Christ," as the locus of renewal of this primal unity. Moreover (and this is the most radical aspect of Origen's theory) the salvation of believers is contingent upon the eventual conviction and acceptance of the Christian faith by those outside the Church!

Conclusion

In the final analysis we see that Origen's concern was not for the freedom of the individual as an independent entity, but for the freedom that results in unity. As John D. Zizioulas has aptly put it, the freedom that results in division (diairesis) is only an illusory freedom, since it binds us to the necessity of maintaining our own unique stance apart from our fellows. True freedom, according to Zizioulas, is that which permits us to maintain our uniqueness through difference (diaphora), for it is only through the maintenance of our unique identity that we can truly enter into communion with others. This is the unity of the true Church. [61]

Origen, in a similar fashion, saw division as the great enemy of salvation. He was not comfortable with branding any being as 'lost' or 'beyond hope'. Instead, he saw such souls as not only engaged in a long, slow process of education, but also as eminently useful for the Church, since these souls would be the future beneficiaries of the divine theology that Origen held so dear.

Endnotes

[1] Acts 3:20-21.

[2] Empedocles, fragment 16, in Diels, Kranz, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmann 1951).

[3] Ps.-Plato, Axiochus 370b, tr. J.P. Hershbell, in J.M. Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1997).

[4] Cf. Franz Cumont (1921), Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans (Montana: Kessinger Publishing Company, reprint), pp. 30-31, 56.

[5] Plato, Statesman 269c-274e.

[6] Chrysippus, Fragmenta Logica et Physica 625.1-15, in von Arnim, ed., Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Leipzig: Teubner 1903).

[7] Arius Didymus, Fragmenta 37; Long and Sedley, tr., ed., The Hellenistic Philosophers (New York: Cambridge University Press 1987), p. 309.

[8] Cf. Rudolph Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, tr. Rev. R.H. Fuller (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company 1956), p. 148.

[9] Vettius Valens 57.5, in W. Kroll, ed., Vettii Valentis Anthologiarum Libri (Berlin: Weidmann 1908, 1973); cp. Dorotheus of Sidon, Fragmenta Graeca 380.14, in D. Pingree, ed. Dorothei Sidonii Carmen Astrologicum (Leipzig: Teubner 1976).

[10] Cf. B.P. Copenhaver, tr., ed., Hermetica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992), p. 168.

[11] Cf. Corpus Hermeticum VIII.4, IX.5-6, X.6, etc.

[12] C.H. X.18, tr. Copenhaver.

[13] Cf. for example, C.H. VI.4, and cp. V.3-9.

[14] Plato, Laws 903c.

[15] St. Irenaeus of Lyons, Against Heresies 1.24.7; B. Layton, tr., ed., The Gnostic Scriptures (New York: Doubleday 1987), p. 425.

[16] Cf. W. Barnstone, ed., The Other Bible (New York: Harper Collins 1984), p. 626.

[17] St. Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium Haeresium 7.20.1-7.27.13, in M. Marcovich, ed., Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1986).

[18] Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century Church (Atlanta: John Knox Press 1983), p. 41.

[19] Basilides, "Fragment F," in Layton, Gnostic Scriptures, p. 439.

[20] St. Irenaeus, Against Heresies 1.1.1-1.8.5; Layton, pp. 276-302.

[21] H. Crouzel, Origen: The Life and Thought of the First Great Theologian, tr. A.S. Worrall (T.&T. Clark Ltd. 1989), p. 195.

[22] This is a necessarily brief and therefore inadequate description of Kant's doctrine, which is rather more complex; but it does convey the general sense of what Kant states with much greater precision and at far greater length.

[23] Cf. Origen, De Principiis 2.9.2-7, 3.3.5.

[24] J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, in R.C. Solomon, ed., Phenomenology and Existentialism (New York: Harper and Row 1972), p. 465.

[25] De Prin. 3.1.6.

[26] De Oratione 5.2-3, in Origenes Werke, vol. 1; Die Griechlischen Christlichen Schriftseller 3, P. Koetschau, ed. (Leipzig: Hinrichs 1899). [Hereafter this series will be abbreviated GCS]

[27] De Prin. 1.4.1; however, for an alternate view (with which I disagree) see L. Hennessey, "The Place of Saints and Sinners After Death," in C. Kannengiesser and W.L. Petersen, eds., Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1988), p. 310, and note 46.

[28] Commentary on John 2.3.

[29] De Prin. 3.1.19.

[30] Comm. John 1.24-28.

[31] Origen, De Orat. 6.3.1-15.

[32] De Prin. 3.5.4.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Plato, Republic 533c-d; Plotinus, Enneades 1.3.5-6.

[35] Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs: Prologue, tr. R.P. Lawson, in Quasten and Plumpe, ed., Ancient Christian Writers, vol. 26 (Ramsey, NJ: Newman Press 1956), p. 45.

[36] Cf. Jerome, Epistles 124.3,13; cp. Origen, Commentary on Romans 5.10.13.

[37] Commentary on Romans 5.10.15.

[38] De Prin. 2.5.3, tr. Rev. F. Crombie, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company 1979, reprint), p. 208. [Hereafter this series will be abbreviated ANF]

[39] Matthew C. Steenberg, "Origen and the Final Restoration: A Question of Heresy." (c)2001 Monachos.net.

[40] G. Kittel, ed., G.W. Bromiley, tr., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company 1964), p. 180.

[41] De Prin. 3.1.19, tr. Crombie, ANF 4.323 (Greek version).

[42] J.-P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, in Solomon, ed., p. 462.

[43] Cf. Edward Moore, "De-Mything the Logos: Anaximander's Apeiron and the Incarnation," in Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy (Volume 4 Number 1, Winter 2002).

[44] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Part 1, ch. 15, p. 71, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books 1968), p. 202.

[45] Origen, "On Prayer" [De Oratione], tr. R.A. Greer, in Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer and Selected Works (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press 1979), p. 94.

[46] Cf., in the New Testament: Mt 13:35; Lk 11:50; Jn 17:24; Eph 1:4; Heb 4:3; 1 Pet 1:20; Rev 13:8.

[47] De Prin. 3.5.4-5.

[48] De Prin. 2.8.4. Origen was not above using puns and word-plays to make a point.

[49] J.W. Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century Church, p. 109.

[50] De Oratione 6.2, tr. Greer.

[51] G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 2, tr. E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press; Bison Books 1995), p. 435.

[52] De Prin. 3.6.6, tr. Crombie, ANF 4.347.

[53] Cf. Verlyn Verbrugge, "Origen's Ecclesiology and the Biblical Metaphor of the Church as the Body of Christ," in Kannengiesser, Petersen, ed., Origen of Alexandria: His World and Legacy, p. 278.

[54] J.M. Robinson, ed., The Nag Hammadi Library (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1978), p. 58; The Tripartite Tractate 57:10-59f.

[55] Da-sein: according to Martin Heidegger, our primordial mode of being-in-the-world which gives the world to us only through the mediation of a "mood" (Stimmung). Since every mood is an alteration to brute Da-sein, in the last analysis, only becoming truly "holds sway." Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. J. Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press 1996), pp. 126-131 {Sein und Zeit I.v, 134-140}.

[56] Origen, In Jeremiam 20.3. GCS 6.

[57] Homiliae in Lucam 17. GCS 49.

[58] ANF 4.260.

[59] V. Verbrugge, "Origen's Ecclesiology," in Kannengiesser, Petersen, ed., Origen of Alexandria: His World and Legacy, p. 281-283.

[60] Commentary on Romans 7.5.10, tr. T.P. Scheck, in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 104 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 2002), p. 77.

[61] John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (Orthodox Peace Fellowship "Occasional Paper" no. 19): http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/jim_forest/Met-john.htm

http://www.quodlibet.net/articles/moore-origen.shtml

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[1]         Ὁ αἱρετικὸς Ὠριγένης.  Χρήστος Τσεκούρας, πτυχ. Ιστορίας ΕΚ.ΠΑ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΙΚΟ ΕΣΥ Τ. 71, ΙΑΝ.-ΦΕΒΡ.-ΜΑΡΤ. 2012, ΤΡΙΚΟΡΦΟ ΦΩΚΙΔΟΣ

[2]          Origen and Origenism. Catholic Encyclopedia http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11306b.htm

[3]   Деяния Вселенских соборов. СПб. 1996, т.3., IV -V Соборы, стр. 536-537

[4]   Правила Православной Церкви с  толкованиями Никодима, епископа Далматино-Истрийского. Репринт. СТСЛ. 1996, т.1, с. 432

[5]   См. Правила Святых Вселенских Соборов с толкованиями. Репринт. М. Паломник. Сибирская благозвоница. 2000, с. 258

[6]          Evagrius, "Hist.", IV, xxxviii

[7]          Justinian, Liber adversus Originem, anathemas 7 and 9.

[8]   См. обширную библиографию в Ωριγένης http://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ωριγένης

[9]          Origen and Origenism. Catholic Encyclopedia http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11306b.htm

[10] Το Γράμμα αυτό σώζεται στο «Χρονικόν» του Γεωργίου Μοναχού ή Αμαρτωλού και δημοσιεύεται στην Patrologia Graeca, τόμος 110, σελ. 780-784

[11]       Πρακτικά τῶν Ἁγίων Συνόδων. Ἔκδ. Καλύβης Τιμίου Προδρόμου. Ἅγιον Ὄρος, τόμος Β'σ. 370 «...μετά ταῦτα κεῖται Ἑλλινηστί καί Λατοωισστί Ἰουστινιανοῦ τοῦ Αὐτοκράτορου κατά τῶν σφαλμάτων τοῦ Ὡριγενοῦς πραγματεία...»

[12] См. М. С. Иванов. Апкатастасис. Православная энциклопедия. http://www.pravenc.ru/http://www.pravenc.ru/text/ Игноируя решения V Вселенского собоа М. С. Иваов лишь пишет следующее: «Многообразие представлений о всеобщем спасении, а также тот факт, что возможность всеобщего спасения допускали авторитетные церковные писатели, показывают, что в истории Церкви проблема А. не всегда решалась в рамках частного богословского мнения. Когда она оставалась в этих рамках, Церковь проявляла к сторонникам А. пастырское снисхождение и соборно не осуждала их ошибочных взглядов. Поэтому в течение долгого времени не были осуждены касавшиеся этой проблемы воззрения Оригена, а богословское мнение свт. Григория Нисского вовсе не подвергалось осуждению. Когда же ошибочные взгляды становились привлекательными для мн. христиан, напр. для монахов-оригенистов, Церковь, как заботливая мать, ограждала своих чад от вероучительных заблуждений, соборным голосом подвергая последние строгому осуждению. Увеличение количества последователей Оригена привело к тому, что александрийский учитель был осужден Александрийским Собором 399 г. Относительно времени его повторного осуждения нек-рые историки (в частности, проф. В. В. Болотов) высказывают сомнение в том, что Ориген был осужден V Всел. Собором. «Но с канонической стороны,- заключает Болотов,- это не ведет к важным последствиям: шестой и седьмой Вселенские Соборы, несомненно, предают анафеме и Оригена» (Собрание церковно-исторических трудов. М., 1999. Т. 1. С. 411-412). Последние 2 Собора анафематствуют и преемника Оригена по Александрийской школе Дидима Слепца. »

[13] Евагрий Схоластик. Церковная история. М. 1997, кн. IV,39, с. 187

[14] См. Ἰωάννης Κουρεμπελές Λέκτορας ΑΠΘ. Η ΠΕΜΠΤΗ ΚΑΙ Η ΕΚΤΗ ΟΙΚΟΥΜΕΝΙΚΕΣ ΣΥΝΟΔΟΙ

         ΘΕΟΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΪΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΟΙΚΟΥΜΕΝΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΟΠΤΙΚΗ. Α. Η ΔΕΥΤΕΡΗ ΩΡΙΓΕΝΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΕΡΙΔΑ ΣΤΟ ΠΛΑΙΣΙΟ ΤΗΣ Ε’ ΟΙΚΟΥΜΕΝΙΚΗΣ ΣΥΝΟΔΟΥб σελ. 9-10. Автор показывает неубедительность аргументов отвергающих факт вынесения осуждения Оригену и его учению на этом соборе

[15] Деяния Вселенских Соборов. СПб. 1996, т. 3,  IV — V соборы, с. 472.

[16] Там же, с. 537

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